

Cookies: HTTP State Management Mechanism

draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-08

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Recent changes: -08 draft version

- Align on HTML terminology for origins
 - Replaced "globally unique identifier" with "opaque origin". ([#1416](#))
- Control characters in `set-cookie-strings`
 - Explicitly specified handling of control characters in `set-cookie-strings` (consistent with current behavior of Chrome). ([#1420](#))
- Cookie retrieval algorithm
 - Refactored retrieval algorithm to support cookie retrieval by non-HTTP APIs, allowing more complete specification of SameSite behavior consistent with Firefox and Chrome. ([#1428](#))
- Lax-allowing-unsafe SameSite enforcement mode
 - Defined optional "Lax+POST" behavior (implemented by Chrome and Firefox). ([#1435](#))
- User agent cookie policy
 - Defined a user agent's cookie policy and clarified ways in which cookies can be ignored according to the cookie policy. ([#1013](#))
- Editorial fixes
 - [#1425](#), [#1469](#), [#1505](#), [#1516](#), [#1527](#), etc.

Draft issues status

21 open issues:

- Defer/close: "6265bis-defer" label (not in scope, lacks consensus, needs work)
 - [#1526](#), [#1430](#), [#1289](#), [#1042](#), [#762](#), [#718](#), [#525](#), [#494](#), [#441](#)
- Investigate interop, define in spec (likely valid issues)
 - [#1531](#), [#1517](#), [#1508](#), [#1502](#), [#1418](#), [#1399](#), [#1385](#), [#1340](#), [#1332](#), [#1288](#), [#1210](#), [#1073](#)

Open draft issues by topic

"Investigate interop, define in spec (likely valid issues)" bucket:

- Cookie and Set-Cookie headers (syntax, parsing, serialization)
 - [#1531](#), [#1517](#), [#1502](#), [#1399](#), [#1210](#), [#1073](#)
- Cookie size limits
 - [#1340](#)
- Blocking/ignoring cookies; pre-existing invalid cookies
 - [#1508](#), [#1418](#), [#1385](#)
- Domain attribute
 - [#1332](#)
- SameSite attribute
 - [#1288](#)

Cookie truncation ([#1531](#))

- Recent PR ([#1420](#)) specified control character handling while parsing a provided cookie:
 - Truncate at the first CR, LF, or NUL byte.
 - Reject the cookie if there are any other control characters present.
- Truncating in this way may enable an attack:
 - A site may use

```
document.cookie = "before" + attackerControlled + "after";
```
 - Attacker can manipulate the cookie value.
- Considering rejecting all cookies containing any control character (rather than truncating).
 - Investigating web compatibility.

Cookie size limits ([#1340](#))

- Current spec text:
 - "General-use user agents SHOULD provide ... [the capability of storing] at least 4096 bytes per cookie (as measured by the sum of the length of the cookie's name, value, and attributes)."
- User agents enforce limits differently, providing a fingerprinting mechanism.
 - Chrome: Max 4096 bytes for whole cookie string.
 - Curl: Max 5000 bytes for whole cookie string, max 4096 bytes for name + value.
 - Firefox: Max 4096 bytes for name + value, max 1024 bytes for path.
 - Safari: Max 5000 bytes for whole cookie string.
- Considering standardizing limits:
 - 4096 bytes for name+value, 1024 bytes for each attribute value.
 - Investigating web compatibility.