

# HTTP

# Unprompted Authentication

[draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth](#)

IETF 116 – Yokohama – 2023-03-28

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# Quick Summary, Motivation, History

Client authenticates to server

Using asymmetric cryptography

Server hides the fact that it serves authenticated resources

Adopted by HTTPBIS last month

# Rough Shape of Solution

Use TLS Key exporter to generate nonce

Sign or HMAC the nonce


Doesn't leak any information

Can't be replayed on a separate connection

# Shape of Header (this changed since last time)

Unprompted-Authentication: Signature k=:YmFzZW1lbnQ=;;s=7; p=:SW5z...IQ==:

Unprompted-Authentication: HMAC k=:YmFzZW1lbnQ=;;h=6;p=:SW5z...IQ==:



New header

2 new HTTP auth schemes

(Before we had a new concept of "Unprompted auth schemes",  
now reuses preexisting HTTP auth schemes)

## #2440: Sure, an IANA registry! But which one?

Unprompted-Authentication: Signature k=:YmFzZW1lbnQ=: **s=7**; p=:SW5z...IQ==:

Unprompted-Authentication: HMAC k=:YmFzZW1lbnQ=: **h=6**; p=:SW5z...IQ==:

Client tells server which signature/hash algorithm is in use 

Need some sort of extensible mechanism to allow adding new ones later

- TLS SignatureScheme & HashAlgorithms registries but orphaned by RFC 8447
- Possibility of using JSON Web Algorithms registry (but complexities with "alg")
- Should we just create a new registry?

## #2432: New header vs existing Authorization header

Now that we've made HMAC and Signature regular HTTP authentication schemes, do we actually need a separate "Unprompted Authentication" header?

### RFC 9110 s11.6.2:

The "Authorization" header field allows a user agent to authenticate itself with an origin server -- usually, but **not necessarily**, after receiving a 401 (Unauthorized) response.



# [#2428](#), [#2429](#): TLS Key Exporter Context

Currently nonce is generated via TLS key exporter with empty context

Should we add the following to the context?

- Signature/hash algorithm
- Key identifier
- Origin
- URL



## #2439: Contextualizing Signatures

Currently we just sign the nonce

Could be bad if key are reused

Two solutions:

- Add a fixed context string `UnPrOmPtEdAuThFoRfUnAnDpRoFiT`
- Tell people not to reuse keys



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