

A nighttime photograph of the Montreal skyline, featuring several illuminated skyscrapers and their reflections on the water in the foreground. The sky is dark, and the city lights create a vibrant, colorful scene.

Secondary Certificates


IETF 102 – Montréal

Since London....




Everything on Control Stream

Draft 00



Draft 01



More explicit

Draft 00

- CERTIFICATE contained flag for AUTOMATIC_USE
 - Servers MAY consider this certificate for any request the client makes
 - If challenged, client doesn't know whether server already tried that certificate
- Servers MUST set AUTOMATIC_USE on all certificates

Draft 01

- USE_CERTIFICATE contains flag for UNSOLICITED
 - Indicates that server hasn't asked for a certificate, but client is offering one just in case
 - If server challenges for certificate, client knows the proffered one didn't work
- If you want certificate used on every request, send USE_CERTIFICATE with every request

More explicit

Draft 01

Clients probe for certificates by sending `CERTIFICATE_NEEDED` for an idle stream

- ...because the stream will be used for a request to that origin
- ...and the request can't proceed until the client sees the cert

Draft 02

Clients probe for certificates by sending `CERTIFICATE_NEEDED` for stream 0

- ...because the server certificate is a property of the connection

More delegation to TLS

Draft 00

- CERTIFICATE_REQUEST carries OID filters to describe desired cert
- CERTIFICATE carries cert chain
- CERTIFICATE_PROOF carries signature proving possession of cert
- USE_CERTIFICATE without Cert-ID refuses request

More delegation to TLS

Draft 00

- CERTIFICATE_REQUEST carries OID filters to describe desired cert
- CERTIFICATE carries cert chain
- CERTIFICATE_PROOF carries signature proving possession of cert
- USE_CERTIFICATE without Cert-ID refuses request

Draft 01

- CERTIFICATE_REQUEST carries Exported Authenticator Request
- CERTIFICATE carries Exported Authenticator
 - Includes cert chain + proof
- ~~CERTIFICATE_PROOF~~
- USE_CERTIFICATE without Cert-ID refuses request

More delegation to TLS

Draft 00

- CERTIFICATE_REQUEST carries OID filters to describe desired cert
- CERTIFICATE carries cert chain
- CERTIFICATE_PROOF carries signature proving possession of cert
- USE_CERTIFICATE without Cert-ID refuses request

Draft 01

- CERTIFICATE_REQUEST carries Exported Authenticator Request
- CERTIFICATE carries Exported Authenticator
 - Includes cert chain + proof
- ~~CERTIFICATE_PROOF~~
- USE_CERTIFICATE without Cert-ID refuses request

Draft 02

- CERTIFICATE_REQUEST carries Exported Authenticator Request
- CERTIFICATE carries Exported Authenticator
- Exported Authenticator with empty cert chain refuses request

Mitigate MitM

Draft 01

SETTING_HTTP_CERT_AUTH: 1

SETTING_HTTP_CERT_AUTH: 1

CERTIFICATE:

(Exported Authenticator)

Invalid!

Draft 02





SETTING_HTTP_CERT_AUTH:

(TLS Exporter)






Invalid!

Open Issues


Binding of Frame Types



Binding of Frame Types



Binding of Frame Types



Questions


- Should cross-responses be permitted in the first place?
 - “You asked for a certificate for ‘example.com’ and a certificate for ‘images.example.com’ – this certificate covers both.”
- Should the CERTIFICATE frame explicitly contain the Request-ID of the CERTIFICATE_REQUEST?
 - Can be retrieved from the Exported Authenticator
 - Parity with CERTIFICATE_REQUEST structure

The Fly in the Ointment


A close-up photograph of a fly resting on a large, vibrant green leaf. The fly is positioned in the center-right of the frame, facing left. Its body is dark, and its wings are spread out. The leaf's veins are clearly visible, and the background is a soft, out-of-focus green. The text 'The Fly in the Ointment' is overlaid on the left side of the image.

Misissued Certificates

Status Quo




With Secondary Certs




Key Compromise

Status Quo



With Secondary Certs



Path forward?

Permit Normal Certificates

- Misissued certificates are harder to trace
 - Attacker's domain doesn't need to be included
- Compromised certificates are easier to use
 - Attacker doesn't need to hijack the TCP connection, just get you to browse his site

Require New Certificate Properties

- Existing certificates not useful with Secondary Certs
 - Slows deployment once feature supported
- If the property makes the certificate "less secure," would anyone do it?

Proposal: Pin to Primary Domain(s)

- Define new certificate extension
 - Required for server certificates to be used with Secondary Certificates
 - Indicates which primary domains (from TLS handshake) the certificate can be used with
 - Could be wildcard
- Reject server certificates that don't include the extension
 - ...or that are used under a different primary certificate
- Do we need something for client certs?

